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VICTIM TESTIMONY IN SEX CRIME
PROSECUTIONS:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE RAPE SHIELD
PROVISION AND THE USE OF





South Carolina has recently joined other states in framing a
more comprehensive statutory law of sexual offenses., The new
law has replaced the crime of "rape" with the broader concept of
"criminal sexual conduct" and has significantly changed the evi-
dentiary rules in such prosecutions. This article examines recent
case developments affecting the procedural standards for admit-
ting certain types of testimony in sex crime prosecutions in
South Carolina. This article also explores the boundaries which
have emerged in balancing the right of a criminal defendant to
confront his accusor and the right of a victim to a trial that fo-
cuses on the issues and which does not, in effect, "try the prose-
cutrix instead of the defendant." 2
I. THE RAPE SHIELD PROVISION AND TESTIMONY ON THE
VICTIM'S CHARACTER
There is perhaps no more controversial issue in the prosecu-
tion of sexual offenses than the admissibility of evidence about
* Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division of South Carolina Attor-
ney General's Office, 1979-81. Assistant Solicitor, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit for South
Carolina, 1981-Present. B.A. 1973, University of South Carolina; J.D. 1977, University of
South Carolina.
1. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-651 to -730 (Supp. 1981). Gray, Rape Reform in
South Carolina, 30 S.C.L. Rxv. 45 (1979) is a good primer on the statute and the changes
it has effected in the law of sexual offenses.
2. State v. McCoy, 274 S.C. 70, 72, 261 S.E.2d 159, 160 (1979).
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the victim's reputation and character. The position of the de-
fense is that reputation and character bear on the issue of con-
sent,3 since it is reasonable to conclude that one of "loose
morals" would have given freely that which the state asserts was
taken by force. The state counters that one individual's relation-
ship with another person on another occasion has little or no
bearing on the voluntariness of sex with the particular defen-
dant on the occasion in issue. Controversy over this issue ap-
pears to have motivated the decision to draft the new law4 as
well as the first serious challenge to its constitutionality. 5
The "rape shield" provision of the criminal sexual conduct
statute6 provides that evidence of sexual conduct by the victim
with others, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct, and
reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct are generally
inadmissible in a prosecution. The statute also sets forth several
exceptions. Evidence of the victim's sexual conduct with the de-
fendant or evidence of specific instances of sexual activity with
persons other than the defendant that is introduced to show the
source or origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease and about which
evidence has been previously introduced at trial is admissible
provided the judge finds that the evidence is relevant to a mate-
rial fact at issue and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature
does not outweigh its probative value. However, evidence of spe-
cific instances of sexual activity which would constitute adultery
and would be admissible under rules of evidence to impeach
credibility is not inadmissible under the provision. Should the
defendant propose to offer this type of evidence, or should such
evidence be revealed in other testimony during the course of
trial, the statute requires an in-camera hearing to determine
whether the proposed evidence is admissible.
In State v. Gunter, the defendant was convicted of crimi-
3. Under the supreme court's decision in State v. Cox, 274 S.C. 624, 266 S.E.2d 784
(1980), the state is no longer required to prove lack of consent to intercourse as a specific
element of the crime. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-630 (1976).
4. See generally, H. KALVEN & H. ZEisEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-51 (1966); Boh-
mer & Blumberg, Twice Traumatized: The Rape Victim and the Court, 58 JUDICATURE
391, 396, 399 (1975); Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61
CALIF. L. REV. 919, 934-36 (1973).
5. State v. McCoy, 274 S.C. 70, 261 S.E.2d 159 (1979).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-659.1 (Supp. 1981).
7. 273 S.C. 347, 256 S.E.2d 317 (1979).
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nal sexual conduct in the first degree and sentenced to twenty-
five years. According to the testimony of the victim, the defen-
dant came to her door early in the morning and asked to see the
victim's boyfriend. When told the boyfriend was not there, the
defendant asked to use the bathroom. Once inside, he forced the
woman into the bedroom and raped her at knifepoint. On cross-
examination, defense counsel attempted to question the woman
about her venereal disease. The solicitor objected and the jury
was sent out. At the hearing, defense counsel demonstrated that
the purpose of the questioning was to show that the victim had
given a venereal infection to "the defendant in prior intercourse.
The testimony was therefore evidence of the victim's sexual con-
duct with the defendant and was admissible under the shield
statute. When the jury returned, the solicitor questioned the vic-
tim about the venereal infection and defendant's counsel was
then allowed to cross-examine fully on the issue. On appeal the
defendant contended that the trial judge committed reversible
error by requiring him to comply with the provisions of Section
16-3-651(2) of the South Carolina Code before questioning the
prosecutrix about whether she had venereal disease, thereby
compelling him to disclose his theory of defense prior to present-
ing his case.
The supreme court affirmed the conviction, concluding that
the defendant had failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced
by the procedure followed at trial8 Because the procedure was
required by the statute under such circumstances and had been
ushered in by defense counsel's own questioning, a contention of
reversible error was without merit. Further, defense counsel's
cross-examination on the issue blunted any argument that the
procedure had denied defendant his right of confrontation.
Some additional aspects of the Gunter case and the court's
decision warrant further discussion. The opinion is among those
which have begun to map out a doctrine of "invited error" in
review of criminal cases in South Carolina.9 Under this doctrine,
8. The appellant bears the burden of establishing prejudice on review. State v. Mc-
Phail, 115 S.C. 333, 339, 105 S.E. 638, 640 (1920).
9. In three recent decisions, the court has clearly indicated that the doctrine is one
on which it will rely when defendant's chosen strategy or conduct has provided his
ground of review. State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 538, 273 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1981); State v.
Faulkner, 274 S.C. 619, 622, 266 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1980); State v. Gilbert, 273 S.C. 690,
697, 258 S.E.2d 890, 894 (1979).
1982]
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a defendant who brings about or secures a ruling at trial will not
be permitted to profit on appeal from the court's acceding to the
defendant's strategy. The rule arises out of the basic tenet of
fairness in the proceedings; a defendant may not, by his own
conduct, "build in" the reversal of his conviction on appeal.
Furthermore, the Gunter case demonstrates, as does the
rape shield provision itself, that the presence of a venereal infec-
tion can be important circumstantial evidence in a prosecution
for criminal sexual conduct. It can be probative as to prior con-
tacts between the defendant and the prosecutrix, or it can indi-
cate that the disease was contracted by the victim near the time
the attack occurred. The evidentiary value of an infection de-
pends upon the medical records which record the dates and
other information about medical treatment. These pertinent
records would normally be admissible in court,10 and it is at this
point that a serious gap exists in current legislation.
Presently, by statute, all information and records held by
the Department of Health and Environmental Control and its
agents relating to a known or suspected case of venereal disease
are deemed strictly confidential and may not be released, under
subpoena or otherwise, except under special circumstances.',
The exceptions include release of nonidentifying information for
statistical purposes, release with the consent of all persons
named in the records, release necessary to enforce other provi-
sions and regulations concerning venereal disease, and release in
cases involving a minor if a report is required under the Child
Protection Act.12 The omission of an exception for release in
criminal proceedings leaves both the state and the defendant
without the means for securing the records of an unconsenting
party. While the state could choose not to prosecute when a vic-
tim refused to consent to disclosure of records possibly exculpa-
tory of the defendant,1 3 the defendant can not be compelled to
See also'State v. McCrary, 242 S.C. 506, 509, 131 S.E.2d 687, 688 (1963); Shearer v.
Deshon, 240 S.C. 472, 484, 126 S.E.2d 514, 520 (1962).
10. See, e.g. State v. Duncan, 274 S.C. 379, 383, 264 S.E.2d 421, 423 (1980); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 19-5-510 (Supp. 1981).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-29-135 (Supp. 1981).
12. 1977 S.C. Acts 488.
13. Compare Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and State v. Cox, 274 S.C. 624,
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release his records, even though divulging such information
would not violate his privilege against self-incrimination.1' In
some instances, the closed record statute poses a troublesome
obstacle to the truth-seeking function of significant criminal
proceedings. It should be amended by the legislature in the in-
terests of the defendant, the victim, and society.
In State v. McCoy,15 the defendant alleged that the rape
shield provision violated the confrontation clauses of the State
and Federal Constitutions. 6 At trial, the defendant contended
that he had been having a secret affair with the victim and that
she shot him during an argument. The victim testified that the
defendant had surprised her at knife-point in her home, forced
her into the bedroom, and cut off her clothing. While he per-
formed an act of oral sex on her, she pulled a pistol from under
the pillow of her bed and shot him. The defendant was appre-
hended by police shortly after he ran from the house.17 At the
beginning of the trial, defense counsel unsuccessfully moved to
dismiss the indictment on grounds that the rape shield provision
unconstitutionally restricted the evidence and procedure in the
case. On appeal, the defendant argued that his right of confron-
tation had been denied. The State contended that the statute
was constitutional since it merely struck a balance between min-
imally relevant evidence and the clear probability of undue
prejudice.
In its opinion, the South Carolina Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that the right to cross-examine a prosecuting witness is
generally of constitutional dimensions. The court noted, how-
ever, that the recent trend in cases of rape or sexual assault of
trying the victim instead of the defendant was a major concern
of the legislature in revising the law. Moreover, "[t]he State has
a legitimate interest in encouraging victims to report crimes and
to present testimony against offenders," and this "interest is
served by discouraging the oftentimes pointless and sometimes
cruel treatment of victims who testify."' 8
14. Compare Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (privilege against self-
incrimination does not apply to evidence of a "nontestimonial" nature) with State v.
Jones, 268 S.C. 227, 232, 233 S.E.2d 287, 288 (1977).
15. 274 S.C. 70, 261 S.E.2d 159 (1979).
16. U.S. CONsT. amend VI; S.C. CONST. art. I, §14
17. Record at 17-25, 145.
18. 274 S.C. at 73, 261 S.E.2d at 160.
1982]
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Referring to the judge-made rule that evidence of sexual
conduct with others is relevant to the issue of consent,19 the
court focused on the rule's rationale that sexual conduct with
one person tends to prove consent to sex with another person.
The court concluded that the rule's logic was anachronistic and
that the probative value of such evidence has diminished in a
"modern era of more fluid morals."20 The provision does not
prohibit all evidence of the victim's past sexual conduct, but
merely strikes a proper balance between the interests of society
and victim on the one hand, and the constitutional rights of the
defendant on the other. The court cited decisions from Colo-
rado, Michigan, and Ohio in support of its interpretation of the
provision.21
The "interest balancing" which underlies the supreme
court's reasoning in McCoy is no different than the task any
court faces in ruling on the admissibility of evidence that is rele-
vant but potentially prejudicial. The balancing process is a re-
flection of the fact that, notwithstanding its adversarial nature,
the central purpose of a criminal trial is "the disposition of the
charge in accordance with the truth. '22 Thus, a trial judge must
carefully weigh relevance against the potential for prejudice
when he rules on the admissibility of evidence of the defen-
dant's character. 23 Similarly, the rape shield provision places -the
victim on an equal footing with the defendant by limiting the
question of the victim's character to the issues at trial.
II. THE USE OF DEPOSITION TESTIMONY
The defendant's right of confrontation gives rise to one of
the greatest concerns of the victim's testimony at trial. The Ac-
Coy decision recognized that the humiliation of publicly describ-
ing a sexual attack is a deterrent to the victim's reporting the
crime and testifying at trial. Fortunately, a recent decision of
19. See State v. Taylor, 57 S.C. 483, 485, 35 S.E. 729, 729 (1900).
20. 274 S.C. at 73, 261 S.E.2d at 160.
21. Id. at 74-75, 261 S.E.2d at 161-62 citing People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 369-
70, 585 P.2d 275, 278 (1978); People v. Thompson, 76 Mich. App. 705, 711, 257 N.W.2d
268, 272 (1977); State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St. 2d 14, 18, 391 N.E.2d 337, 340-41 (1979).
22. Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23. See, State v. Griffin, - S.C. -, 285 S.E.2d 631 (1981); State v. Rivers, 273 S.C.
75, 254 S.E.2d 299 (1979); State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923).
[Vol. 34
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the South Carolina Supreme Court indicates that the public em-
barrassment of the ordeal might be minimized under certain
circumstances.
In State v. Sinclair,24 the defendant was charged with com-
mitting a lewd act on a nine-year old girl. Prior to the victim's
testimony, the trial judge excluded the public from the court-
room. The child stated that on the day in question, she went to
a neighborhood park with her younger brother. At the park, she
was accosted by a freckled, nervous, middle-aged man attired in
a tan shirt, green shorts, green socks, and black boots. This
description substantially matched the defendant. The identifica-
tion issue was an important one at trial, because the defendant
asserted an alibi defense, contending he was at his wife's place of
employment on the afternoon in question. He was convicted
and, on appeal, argued that the trial judge deprived him of his
rights to a public trial and due process of law by excluding the
public during the child's testimony. He also argued that the ex-
clusion caused the jury to place undue significance on the wit-
ness's testimony.
The supreme court affirmed the conviction and rejected the
contention that the court closure had prejudiced the defendant's
right to a fair trial. The court concluded that the facts of Sin-
clair were governed by two recent decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, Gannett v. DePasquale25 and Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia.26 Both cases addressed the issue of
courtroom closure. The Gannett decision expressly held open
the possibility of excluding some members of the public in cases
of violent crimes against minors.2 7 The Richmond Newspapers
case indicated that the trial of a criminal case must be open to
the public unless there are articulated findings by the trial judge
demonstrating a sufficient overriding interest.28 In Sinclair, the
South Carolina Supreme Court found that the interest in the
testifying child's well-being overrode the defendant's right to a
public trial, but that closure of the proceeding was not the only
24. 275 S.C. 608, 274 S.E.2d 411 (1981).
25. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
26. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
27. 443 U.S. at 388 n. 19 (dictum).
28. 448 U.S. at 2830 (plurality opinion). Compare Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court for the County of Norfolk, 102 S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
1982] 589
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alternative the trial judge could have considered:
The trial judge properly weighed the various competing inter-
ests. There was no abuse of discretion under these circum-
stances despite the fact that the better, statutorily prescribed
practice could have been used whereby the deposition of the
victim would be taken, subject to the appellant's right of con-
frontation, and then simply be read to the jury.
29
The "statutorily prescribed practice" is a provision from
prior rape laws.30 Its retention in the new legislation and Sin-
clair's implicit sanction of its use open the door to the deposi-
tion procedure in future prosecutions. The unanswered question
is whether the deposition statute in effect deprives the defen-
dant of his fundamental right of confrontation, guaranteed by
both State and Federal Constitutions.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
Chambers v. Mississippis1 and Davis v. Alaska3 2 have estab-
lished that the defendant's right to confront and cross-examine
is not absolute and, in appropriate cases, may bow to accommo-
date other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.
Where cross-examination has been limited, the Court has
weighed the various interests of the state and the victim in ex-
cluding certain testimony against the defendant's purpose in
seeking to elicit the testimony, its probative value, and its prob-
able impact or potential prejudice.3 3 The Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Mancusi v. Stubbs3 4 and Ohio v. Roberts"5 indicate that
the guarantee of confrontation does not mandate an in-court op-
portunity to cross-examine. Thus, these decisions reinforce the
validity of the deposition procedure suggested by the South Car-
olina Supreme Court in Sinclair.
In Mancusi, the defendant filed a petition for federal
habeas corpus. He had previously been convicted, but was re-
leased for retrial after obtaining post conviction relief. At the
29. 275 S.C. at 614, 274 S.E.2d at 414 (emphasis added).
30. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-660 to -720 (1976). See State v. Harris, 268 S.C. 117, 232
S.E.2d 231 (1977).
31. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
32. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
33. See id. at 319.
34. 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
35. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
[Vol. 34590
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second trial, the State was unable to produce a witness, then liv-
ing in Sweden, who had testified against the defendant at his
first trial. Instead, the transcript of the earlier testimony of the
witness was read to the jury, giving rise to the defendant's
habeas corpus contention that he had been deprived of his right
to confront a key State's witness.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's
assertion that use of the transcript denied his right of confronta-
tion. The Court concluded that, notwithstanding the existence
of certain procedures to secure out-of-state witnesses in some in-
stances, a witness who was out of the country was sufficiently
"unavailable" to warrant the substitution of his previously tran-
scribed testimony, provided the testimony bore "indicia of relia-
bility.''s6 The Court found that the prior testimony was suffi-
ciently reliable and intimated that, under certain circumstances,
even cross-examination at a preliminary hearing might satisfy
confrontation requirements.
In Roberts, the Supreme Court adopted the Mancusi dic-
tum and held that the preliminary hearing testimony of an ab-
sent State's witness was admissible at trial for substantive pur-
poses when tested by the "equivalent of significant cross-
examination." The defendant was charged with forgery and pos-
session of stolen credit cards. At the preliminary hearing, de-
fense counsel called the defendant's daughter to the stand3 7 and
attempted to elicit an admission that she had given the defen-
dant checks and credit cards wihout telling him that she had no
permission to use them. The girl denied this and, although ques-
tioned extensively, defense counsel at no point asked to have the
witness declared hostile and placed under cross-examination.
3 8
At trial, the daughter failed to respond to the State's subpoena
and the court admitted the preliminary hearing testimony into
evidence. The Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme
36. Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 212-13.
37. In South Carolina, the accused may not offer such testimony or other evidence
in his behalf at a preliminary hearing but is allowed only to cross-examine the witness
presented by the state in its attempt to show probable cause. See State v. White, 243
S.C. 238, 242, 133 S.E.2d 320, 321 (1963); S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-320 (Supp. 1981).
38. Under South Carolina law, upon a showing by counsel that he has been both
surprised and hurt by the testimony of his own witness, counsel may have the witness
declared hostile and subject to cross-examination. State v. Bendoly, 273 S.C. 47, 49, 254
S.E.2d 287, 288 (1979).
1982]
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Court reversed the conviction, the latter concluding that the
lack of actual cross-examination violated the defendant's consti-
tutional rights. The United States Supreme Court disagreed
with the conclusion.
In reversing the Ohio appellate courts, the Supreme Court
retraced earlier decisions, including Mancusi.39 The Court out-
lined a rule of necessity for introducing such evidence. Thus, in
the usual case, the prosecutor must demonstrate the unavailabil-
ity of a declarant whose transcribed testimony he wishes to use
against the defendant. The prosecution must establish that it
has made a "good faith" effort to produce an absent witness.40
The second prerequisite to introduction of the material is that it
satisfy the "indicia of reliability" standard of Mancusi. In Rob-
erts, the Court concluded that the questioning by defense cotm-
sel complied with both the form and purpose of cross-examina-
tion. Regardless of how the questioning might be categorized
under state law, the defendant was afforded both opportunity
for and substantial equivalent of cross-examination.
Chambers, Davis, Mancusi, and Roberts lay a foundation
for the constitutionality of the deposition procedure discussed in
Sinclair. The primary issue before a court considering the use of
a deposition is whether the defendant's right of confrontation
overrides the potential trauma engendered by the child's giving
testimony in open court. Moreover, as the court in Sinclair
noted, the public's first amendment interest in open proceedings
argues against closure as the means of protecting the child's
well-being 1 and supports the use of the deposition procedure.
While it might be argued that the actual presence of the child
leaves the "nonavailability" requirement unsatisfied,
prosecutorial "good faith" in conjunction with a standard of
"reasonableness" effectively counter the point.- For the purposes
of obtaining testimony at trial, severe emotional stress in a mi-
nor child could render her as "unavailable" as the witnesses
were in Mancusi and Roberts. Allowing substantially more than
the "equivalent" of cross-examination through the deposition
procedure will further minimize the risk that the balancing of
39. See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
40. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74.
41. See also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for the County of Norfolk, 102
S. Ct. 2613 (1982).
592 [Vol. 34
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interests has deprived the defendant of his right of
confrontation.42
CONCLUSION
The South Carolina Criminal Sexual Conduct Statute is
part of a significant trend in the law to accord victims of serious
crimes the basic fairness which is guaranteed to defendants. In
deciding Gunter and McCoy, the South Carolina Supreme Court
balanced the interests of the victim, the defendant, and society,
while upholding a legislative determination of what is relevant
in the proceedings. That determination has struck a balance be-
tween the right of confrontation on the one hand and the re-
quirement of relevance or probative worth on the other.
Under the Sinclair decision, the court has opened the door
to a procedure which would minimize trauma for particularly
young victims of sexual attacks. The dictum of that decision is,
apparently, a cautious step toward addressing the needs of vic-
tim-witnesses while satisfying the guarantees of confrontation
and cross-examination. The United States Supreme Court's de-
cisions in Mancusi and Roberts lend authoritative support for
the deposition procedure's eventual acceptance, in limited in-
stances, as an alternative to the trauma of courtroom testimony.
42. It appears that the procedure would only be acceptable if the defendant's right
of confrontation had been sufficiently protected. See State v. Latham, 275 S.C. 550, 273
S.E.2d 772 (1981)(affidavit as to allegations of offense is hearsay and admission deprived
defendant of rights of confrontation and cross-examination). The South Carolina Su-
preme Court appears to have further accorded the defendant the right to personally
confront and question the victim in court, see State v. Lynn, - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 786
(1981), although it is not clear that this would have been the case had the state opposed
the procedure at trial or on appeal. See State v. Sanders, 269 S.C. 215, 237 S.E.2d 53
(1977). It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has indicated that it
will not interpret the United States Constitution as guaranteeing such a literal right of
confrontation between defendant and witness. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63.
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